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WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? 
MONITORING THE RATIFICATION DEBATES 
RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
Executive Summary 
ollowing the success of the EPIN survey on the European elections 2004 (EPIN Working Paper 
No. 11), the authors decided to use a similar approach for monitoring the current ratification 
process of the European Constitutional Treaty. Accordingly, the findings presented in this paper 
are based on the results of a survey conducted among national experts associated with the European 
Policy Institutes Network (EPIN). As such, they are inherently subjective, but nevertheless well-
informed. The report draws on survey data collected in 20 EU member states, supplemented by 
additional sources of information on the remaining countries where available. While the actual 
outcomes may prove our findings wrong in one respect or another, they do indicate interesting 
developments and differences in the respective member states. The added value of this EPIN survey 
lies in its broad comparative scope and analysis rather than its offering an in-depth assessment of each 
national debate. (For the latter, special country reports are envisaged at a later point in time.) The 
EPIN Ratification Monitor project plans to publish regular updates on the rapidly changing situation. 
The main findings of this report are: 
  At the present time, it looks likely that the Constitution will to be ratified in 22 of the 25 
member states, with only the Czech Republic and Poland rated as ‘unsure’ and the United 
Kingdom as ‘rather unlikely’. All countries applying the parliamentary procedure only are 
rated ‘highly likely’ to ratify. In the Czech Republic and Poland, the referenda will actually 
make ratification more likely, because the qualified majorities needed in parliament would be 
difficult to obtain.  
  Concerning political parties, there exists a broad political mainstream in favour of the 
Constitution in almost all member states. However, there are rather clear divisions at the 
centre of the political spectrum in the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Malta. Even in France, the positions of the mainstream political parties are not as clear cut as 
observers usually assume. 
  Procedures, timetables and political conditions for parliamentary ratification and referenda 
vary widely among the member states, making a ‘European’ debate difficult and giving little 
incentive for an exchange of views across national borders. Consequently, at this point in 
time, the focus of the debates is (still) predominantly national in all member states. 
  The key players in the debate are set to be national politicians.  This holds out the promise 
of lively national debates on a European issue in particular in those countries where referenda 
will be held. Yet it also carries the risk that debates may be ‘hijacked’ by national actors 
pursuing a domestic agenda. European actors and transnational involvement of key players are 
still largely absent from the debates. 
  There seems to be a certain set of core issues that is recurring throughout the ratification 
debate in most of the member states. Nevertheless, these issues are looked at through national 
lenses and there appears to be limited scope for transnational influences.  
  Moreover, it is often the issues directly related to the Treaty, which are more technical in 
nature and thus inherently less interesting for the general public, that are used by proponents 
in their attempt to generate support for ratification, whereas political issues tend to be 
brought up more frequently in arguments put forth by opponents to the Treaty. 
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  Two issues are overwhelmingly used as an argument in favour of ratification of the Treaty: the 
provisions on CFSP and the enhanced role of the EU on the global stage that is perceived 
to derive from them. This seems to confirm that citizens want the EU to become more active 
in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Indeed, the creation of the post of EU 
Foreign Minister is also expected to be used largely as a pro-ratification factor. | 1 
WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? 
MONITORING THE RATIFICATION DEBATES 
RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
Main Report 
1.  Introduction: Ratification of the Constitution – A Litmus Test for European 
Integration 
Looking back, the European Constitutional Treaty has already overcome many obstacles. One should 
not forget that until recently the very idea of a European Constitution was unacceptable to many 
political stakeholders. And it was only in May 2000 that the German Foreign Minister kick-started a 
political debate on this issue with his famous ‘Humboldt-speech’ (Fischer, 2000), to which many 
European leaders contributed in the months following. Frustration over the unsatisfactory outcome of 
the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice in December 2000 had risen high enough to inspire fresh ideas 
on EU treaty reform. At the Laeken Summit in December 2001, a Convention on the Future of Europe 
was called into being which, after 16 months of tough and controversial debates and negotiations, 
came up with a common draft for a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. After a failed 
European Summit in December 2003, the Intergovernmental Conference finally reached agreement in 
June 2004 and the Constitutional Treaty was signed by all heads of state and government in Rome in 
October 2004.  
Despite this progress, however, it is clear that the real test still lies ahead: obtaining approval of the 
Constitutional Treaty by the European citizens. Legally speaking, the EU Constitution is still an 
international treaty and as such, it has to be ratified by all member states according to their respective 
national constitutional requirements. This means that approval has to be expressed either through 
parliamentary vote or through popular consultation. In some cases, governments have opted, or might 
opt, to call a referendum in order to give added legitimacy to this important decision. 
The challenge is therefore clear: Where the Convention largely failed to initiate what the Nice 
Declaration of 2000 called a “deeper and wider debate on the future of the European Union” with an 
increasingly disenchanted public, constitutional referenda in many member states will now force 
politicians to make their positions on Europe clear and engage in public campaigning.  
However, the conditions governing ratification – and therefore the prospects for success – vary widely 
from one member state to another. This diversity is problematic, as ratification must be obtained in a 
national context, but the entire European Union will be affected if one member state proves unable or 
unwilling to ratify. Carlos Closa Montero (2004a) described this challenge as “a minefield”. This 
structural problem of a weak ‘European dimension’ was also a key finding of the last EPIN survey on 
the European elections (Kurpas, Incerti and Crum, 2004). It showed that there were actually no 
European election campaigns, but rather 25 national ones, each following a distinct national logic and 
dominated by national actors. Such a scenario carries the risk that the European dimension will be 
entirely lost and that various actors will attempt to ‘hijack’ the European event as a vehicle for 
pursuing their national political interests. This risk is even greater in the ratification process because 
the Constitutional Treaty itself is based on a number of compromises reached between often strongly 
contested ‘national’ positions. 
An additional factor that makes the situation so problematic is the fact that unlike former treaty 
reforms, this time it will be even more difficult – if not impossible – to create ‘opt-outs’ for certain 
member states. This is true in particular for many of the key institutional changes included in the 
Constitution. Either every state votes under the new ‘double-majority’ system of the Constitutional 2 | RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
Treaty or every state sticks to the voting weights of the Nice Treaty. That is, either every state accepts 
a single legal personality of the Union or none does.  
Finally, the great political symbolism of the Constitution and the large amount of political capital 
already invested in the project make the approval of this treaty even more important for the future of 
European integration. For many, success of the Constitution is a strong indicator of whether the Union 
will be a political actor of increasing weight that is based on a common vision and common values or 
whether the limits of political integration have been reached.  
In this complex context, the present survey intends to provide readers with a better idea of national 
specificities and the potential scope of a common ‘European dimension’ in this process. Thus, the 
aims of the survey are to:  
•  assess the likelihood of ratification in the different member states; 
•  give a comparative overview of the national conditions concerning the ratification debates 
(procedure, public and  political support, issues, actors); and 
•  detect possible cross-national influences and parallel developments in the different member 
states. 
The results presented in this document are inherently subjective since they are based to a large extent 
on the observations and predictions of our national experts (listed in Annex 1), who responded 
between November 2004 and January 2005 to a questionnaire elaborated by the EPIN Steering 
Committee. The questionnaire (reproduced in Annex 2) asked seven groups of questions concerning 
the following aspects of the ratification process: 
•  type and procedure of ratification,  
•  current/expected level of support for the Constitutional Treaty,  
•  key players in the debates about ratification (in the political spectrum and in society), and 
•  the central themes of the discussions. 
Responses were received from 20 out of 25 EU member states. This material has been supplemented 
with additional information where appropriate,
1 in particular on those countries not represented in the 
survey (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia).  
The report therefore does not claim to be fully representative or complete. Rather, the main merit of 
this exercise lies in its European-wide scope. Few individuals, if any, will be as well-informed about 
the political dynamics of the ratification debate in as many member states as the collective expertise 
brought together here. The report aims to give an informed overview of the state of the debate in early 
2005, following two parliamentary ratifications and before any referenda have taken place. It is 
designed to serve as a basis for further in-depth analysis as this crucial chapter in the history of the EU 
unfolds. 
2.  Support for the Constitution: What probability for ratification? 
According to the latest survey on the European Constitution by Eurobarometer (2004), a majority 
(68%) of European citizens are in favour of a European constitution. The report cautions, however, 
that “this result must not be seen as an indication of the voting intentions of the countries which are 
considering holding a referendum”, because the result “solely translates the extent to which people 
support the concept of a Constitution (…) and not an assessment of the content of the text proposed for 
ratification (…)”. 
                                                 
1 See in particular the following sources cited in the References: CIDEL Project, the COSAC website, Closa 
Montero (2004b), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2004) and Federal Trust (2005). WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? | 3 
The predictability of ratification is obviously dependent on many factors some of which are yet 
unknown. In this section, member states are categorised on the basis of their estimated probability to 
ratify the Constitution. This prognosis is based on the following sources:  
•  predictions by national experts, 
•  opinion poll data collected in countries where referenda will be held and 
•  public expressions reflecting the current attitudes of political parties and other relevant actors. 
Table 1 sketches the emerging picture. 
Table 1. Probability of ratification, by country 
Status Country 
Already ratified   Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia 
Highly likely  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden 
Rather likely  France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark 
Unsure  Czech Republic, Poland 
Rather unlikely   United Kingdom 
In the three countries where the Constitution has already been ratified by a vote in Parliament – 
Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia – there was little public debate and the vote produced large 
majorities in favour of the Constitution. In Lithuania, 84 ‘yes’ votes stood against only 4 ‘no’ votes 
and 3 abstentions. In Hungary there were 304 votes in favour and just 9 against and 8 abstentions.
2 In 
Slovenia 79 MPs voted in favour while only 4 were against and 7 abstained. 
Looking at the table, one fact is striking: In all member states where ratification is rated ‘unsure’ or 
even ‘rather unlikely’, referenda are to be held. On the other hand, all countries that are currently set to 
stick to parliamentary ratification
3 can be rated as ‘highly likely’ to ratify, because stable majorities 
supporting the government exist, and only opposition parties – mostly from the far left or the far right 
– are mobilising against the Constitution. Malta is the only country rated ‘highly likely’ where 
currently the major opposition party, the socialist Partit Laburista (holding 48% of the seats), is still 
undecided. A clarification of the situation in Malta will probably only be reached by mid-2005, but the 
government majority is stable, so that there is little risk of non-ratification even if the opposition 
decides to go against ratification. At the other end of the scale, there are some countries where 
parliamentary majorities in favour of the Constitution amount to more than 90% (Austria, Cyprus, 
Germany, Greece and Italy). 
In the countries set to hold a referendum, according to our estimates, only Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Spain can at present be rated ‘highly likely’ to ratify. 
In  Luxembourg, approval rates for European integration are traditionally high among all major 
political players. Popular support for the concept of a European Constitution is extremely high 
according to Eurobarometer (2004). The idea is supported by 77%, while 14% are against and 9% 
undecided. An RTL/ILRES poll from October 2004 states that a solid majority of 62% of 
Luxemburgers were in favour of the proposed EU Constitution, while just 24% were against and 14% 
undecided.  
                                                 
2 See Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2004). 
3 There still is a very slight possibility that Slovakia and Sweden will opt for a referendum. With the broad 
parliamentary majorities in favour of the Constitution, the two countries can still be rated as ‘highly likely’ to 
ratify.  4 | RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
In Spain, the first country slated to hold a referendum on February 20th, the two major parties (PSOE 
and Partido Popular) are in favour of the Constitution and the initiative is likely to pass. In fact, one of 
the alleged reasons for Spain to hold its referendum so early is that other European leaders hope it 
might send a positive signal to those member states where the situation is more uncertain. 
Nevertheless, one should be a little careful in the Spanish case owing to the high number of (at least 
until recently) still-undecided voters. In an opinion poll by OPINA for CIS and the Real Elcano 
Instituto (published 10 December 2004) the ‘yes’ side got 41.6%, whereas the ‘no’ side received only 
6%. However, 35.6% were still undecided and 14.8% did not want to vote or intended to vote ‘blank’. 
The Spanish government has reacted by launching an extensive information campaign on 4 January 
2005, about the referendum involving sports, media and pop celebrities to inform citizens about the 
Constitution. 
The last country in this ‘highly likely’ category is Portugal where the two major parties (PS and PSD) 
are also in favour of the Constitution and debate before the (facultative) referendum is therefore not 
expected to be particularly controversial. However, the current political crisis in Portugal following 
the resignation of the government in December 2004 makes new elections necessary and that will 
probably delay the Portuguese referendum from March to late April 2005. There is a risk that the 
referendum will be overshadowed by the current crisis and that the turnout will be too low. According 
to the Portuguese Constitution, the referendum will not have a binding effect if less than 50% of the 
electorate takes part. This is especially worrying as Portuguese citizens also do not feel very well 
informed about the European Constitution.
4 
The next category consists of four countries whose prospect of approving the Constitution in public 
referenda appears ‘rather likely’: Denmark, France, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
In this group, the Netherlands appears the most likely to accept the Constitutional Treaty, receiving a 
rating from our national expert that comes very close to the higher category of ‘highly likely’ to ratify. 
According to Eurobarometer, the general approval of the concept of a European constitution is also 
very high in the Netherlands (73% in favour, 20% against, 6% undecided) compared to other member 
states and an EU-25 average of 68%. The latest available opinion poll on the actual Constitution dates 
back to September 2003 (Intomart for NRC Handelsblad) where 50% of the Dutch population were in 
favour, 20% against and 29% undecided. The consultative referendum will be held in the first half of 
2005 after what has widely been perceived as a successful EU Presidency, but the Dutch role as a ‘net 
payer’ might negatively play into the constitutional debate at a time when the budgetary perspective 
will be negotiated. About 85% of parliamentarians from all major parties are in favour of the 
Constitution, with only smaller parties, such as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, voicing opposition. 
After the positive referendum in the French socialist party in early December 2004 (59% ‘yes’ votes), 
the prospects for a French approval also look more promising. Although the latest Ipsos polls suggest 
a decline in support among voters,
5 the big ‘clash’ over the Constitution between the two major 
political parties – the conservative UMP and the Parti Socialiste – has been avoided and the 
Constitution will not become a political battleground for them. However, parties on the extreme left 
and the extreme right, as well as ‘dissidents’ within the big parties will continue to campaign against 
the Constitution and attempt to appeal to a considerable number of undecided and protest voters. Many 
French people are also very concerned about Turkish membership of the EU and their country’s 
influence within the EU. A successful referendum will depend on the degree to which the debate on 
the Constitution can be kept separate from these two issues. There clearly is an effort now to hold a 
referendum at an early stage – possibly as early as June 2005 – which will also have an impact on the 
prospects of a positive outcome. President Chirac has announced a referendum “before the summer”.  
The  Irish  case also looks quite positive. The fact that the Irish Presidency was so successful in 
negotiating an agreement on the Constitution at the IGC is a very helpful factor for reaching a positive 
                                                 
4 Eurobarometer (2004), p. 18 
5 See Le Cœur (2005). WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? | 5 
result in the referendum, which is foreseen only for 2006. The main political parties support the 
Constitution (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Labour, Progressive Democrats – together accounting for about 
85% of the parliamentary seats) and only Sinn Fein and the small Socialist Party are campaigning 
against it. The Green Party has not yet arrived at a decision on its position. 
As the last member state in this category, Denmark now also looks like a ‘rather likely’ case for 
successful ratification. A CATINÉT research poll for Danish Radio (1 November 2004) found that 
54% of the voters are in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, while only 17.4% are against and 28.6% 
undecided. This stands somewhat in contrast, however, to the findings of the Eurobarometer poll 
(2004). As mentioned above, it only refers to the concept of a European constitution, but it can still 
serve as an indicator in relative terms. Here Denmark is the most sceptical nation with only 44% of its 
people approving this concept (36% against, 20% undecided). In Danish political circles, an internal 
vote of the members of the formerly eurosceptic Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) 
on 21 December 2004, resulted in a 63.8% for the ‘yes’ side. The SF has been an important factor in 
past referenda and its members’ vote gives a positive indication for approval in Denmark. Currently 
pro-Constitution parties hold more than 80% of the seats in the Danish Folketinget. The political 
balance of power may still change to some (probably limited) extent as the next general elections will 
take place on 8 February 2005, while the referendum is only scheduled for the end of 2005 or early 
2006. 
The next category encompasses two countries whose behaviour is very difficult to predict: the Czech 
Republic and Poland. Interestingly, in both cases the referendum is actually likely to help the 
prospects for ratification. 
In Poland, public opinion seems to be changing in favour of European integration, especially in the 
rather eurosceptic rural areas where people now increasingly benefit from EU funds. A CBOS opinion 
poll from 5-8 November 2004, states that 68% of Poles would vote in favour of the Constitution (11% 
against, 21% undecided), while as recently as July 2004, there were still 21% against.
6 However, a 
minimum turnout of 50% for the referendum would be needed in order to make it valid. The Polish 
President Aleksander Kwasniewski and the centre-left parties have spoken out in favour of holding the 
referendum on the same day as presidential elections in autumn 2005, which would ensure a higher 
turnout, while opposition parties have called for a referendum in 2006.
7 If, however, turnout would not 
be high enough, ratification would look rather unlikely, as the parliamentary procedure would require 
a 2/3 majority in favour in both parliamentary chambers. This is unlikely to be obtained, especially if 
eurosceptic parties win seats in the general elections. Currently, only two centre-left parties SLD and 
SDPL as well as the Unia Pracy (Union of Labour) are in favour of the Constitution, while two main 
conservative opposition parties – Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens’ Platform, PO) and Polske 
Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party, PSL) – are still undecided or tend to be against. Other 
important opposition parties (Law and Justice, League of Polish Families, Self Defence) are openly 
against the Constitution.  
In the Czech Republic a similar picture emerges. Here also a referendum would enhance the 
Constitution’s chances of passing, because it would be very difficult to obtain the necessary 60% in 
both chambers of parliament. Currently all parliamentary parties seem to be in favour of holding a 
referendum. The conservative ODS and the Communist Party are opposed to the Constitution while 
the parties of the government coalition – Social Democrats (CSSD), Christian Democrats and Freedom 
Union – are in favour. The views of eurosceptic Czech President Vaclav Klaus (ODS) could also have 
an important impact on public opinion. Unlike the situation in Poland, a minimum turnout is unlikely 
to be required, but the legislative act calling for the referendum is still to be passed. On the other hand, 
public opinion in the Czech Republic has not evidenced the same change in favour of the Constitution 
                                                 
6 See full results on CBOS website (http://www.cbos.pl/Opinia/2004/11_2004.pdf). 
7 Apparently translation errors of the Polish text could delay the ratification process, so that a referendum at the 
time of the presidential elections might become difficult; see euobserver, 20.11.2005: “Translation errors in 
Polish EU Constitution to delay ratification” (http://www.euobserver.com/?sid=18&aid=18184). 6 | RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
as happened in Poland. While the latest Eurobarometer poll cannot be used concerning absolute 
numbers, it can be an indicator of approval in relative terms. Only 63% of Czechs are in favour of the 
concept of a European constitution (18% against, 19% undecided) compared to a 68% EU average and 
even 73% of Poles in favour. A solution could be that the referendum will only be held in June 2006 
(together with the next general elections), when most other member states might have already ratified. 
That fact could influence Czechs to also vote in favour. 
Finally, the United Kingdom marks the least probable case concerning ratification and the only 
country to be rated ‘rather unlikely’ to ratify. There are a number of indications pointing in that 
direction. First of all, the very eurosceptic public opinion (in relative and in absolute terms), A MORI 
poll for the Foreign Policy Centre found that only 31% of British voters are ‘strongly in favour’ or ‘in 
favour’ while 50% were ‘strongly opposed’ or ‘opposed’ to the Constitution (19% undecided).
 8  
Eurobarometer (2004) showed the British coming in second to last place as regards acceptance of the 
concept of a European constitution (49% in favour, 29% against, 22% undecided), which means 19% 
below the EU average in favour. A second factor is the highly divided political scene that provides for 
a controversial and emotional debate. While the Labour government, most of the Labour Party and the 
Liberal Democrats are in favour, there is fierce opposition from large parts of the Conservative Party 
and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The political debate will be fuelled by a number of 
eurosceptic tabloids that are set to play a key role in influencing public opinion in a negative way 
towards the Constitution (see section 4). What might have a positive impact on the outcome of the 
referendum could be a successful British Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005 and the 
possibility that all other member states will already have ratified by the time the British schedule a 
vote on the Constitution. 
3. Procedure: What conditions for ratification in the member states?  
Already the formal procedures demonstrate how much the conditions for ratification differ from one 
member state to another. At the present time (January 2005), 15 member states are committed to ratify 
by parliamentary approval only (of which two have already ratified) and 10 member states will hold a 
referendum (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Referenda and parliamentary ratification 
Referendum  Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, United Kingdom 
Parliamentary 
Ratification only 
Austria, Belgium*, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary (20 Dec 2004), 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania (11 Nov 2004), Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia*, Sweden* 
*Highly likely that parliamentary ratification only. 
 
It is important to underline that ‘referendum’ or ‘parliamentary ratification’ often means something 
very different from one country to another. Table 3 gives an overview of the many national 
peculiarities and is intended to highlight the different legal and political circumstances that are 
influencing the current debates in the member states. 
 
                                                 
8 See MORI, “The Referendum Battle”, September 2004 ( http://www.mori.com/polls/2004/fpc.shtml). | 7 
Table 3. Overview of the ratification process in the different member states 
  Process & timing  Comments 
AT  Parliamentary ratification 
Early 2005 
- Simple majority of Congress & Senate; 2/3 majority if Constitution is changed 
(likely to be obtained) 
- Legally binding referendum (Volksabstimmung) can be initiated by the 
Congress (Nationalrat), if object of referendum changes Austrian Constitution  
- Ruling conservative ÖVP, Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Greens only in favour of 
referendum if it takes place in all MS (preferably at the same time) 
- Freedom Party (government coalition) unconditionally pro referendum  
BE  Parliamentary ratification 
Date still unknown 
- Binding popular votes not foreseen in  Belgian Constitution 
- ‘Conseil d’Etat’ has given negative opinion (29.11.2004) on a possible 
consultative referendum without changing the Constitution 
- Parliamentary majority now against referendum, while PM Verhofstadt (VLD) 
still in favour  
- Christian Democrats (Dehaene) & Flemish (Spirit) and Wallon Socialists (PS) 
against referendum  
- Greens, Liberals (VLD) and extreme-right ‘Vlaams Belang’ in favour 
- 7 parliamentary bodies need to ratify (ratification likely): Both chambers of the 
federal Parliament, Flemish Parliament (Region & Community combined) 2 
regional Parliaments (Wallonia, Brussels), 2 community Parliaments 
(francophone, German-speaking) 
CY  Parliamentary ratification, 
Date still unknown 
- Binding popular votes not foreseen in Cypriot Constitution 
- Only new MS that did not hold referendum on EU membership   
- No significant public debate on a possible referendum on EU Constitution 
CZ  Referendum 
June 2006 
- No constitutional obligation for referendum, but strong political consensus of 
major parliamentary parties in favour 
- Parliamentary ratification would need 3/5 approval in both houses (unlikely to 
be obtained) 
- Binding referendum requires constitutional act, as no general framework 
regulating nationwide referendum yet 
- Likely that no minimum turnout and no additional requirement to refer the 
Treaty to Parliament for ratification will be set (like accession referendum) 
- Most likely that referendum will be held together with general elections  
DE  Parliamentary ratification 
May 2005 (Bundestag) & 
June 2005 (Bundesrat) 
- Parliamentary ratification by 2/3 majority in both houses (likely to be obtained) 
- German federal constitution does not foresee referendum 
- Government proposes to generally change the Constitution (2/3 majority in both 
chambers needed), but Conservatives (CDU/CSU) reject this 
- CSU for referendum on Constitution, but against general provision 
- Strong majority of citizens for referendum on EU-Constitution 
DK  Referendum 
Date still unknown, 
 not before Fall 2005 
- In absence of a 5/6th majority in Parliament, Danish Constitution requires a 
binding referendum when national sovereignty is transferred.  
- Referendum already announced by PM Rasmussen 1 January 2004 
-Referendum will not be combined with referendum on existing Danish ‘opt-outs’ 
(euro, defence, JHA matters) 
ES  Referendum 
20 February 2005 
- Non-obligatory, consultative referendum called by Socialist PM Zapatero 
- Wording: “Do you approve of the Treaty by which a Constitution for Europe is 
established?” 
- Government needs to observe strict neutrality in the campaign 
- Constitutional Court ruled on 13 December 2004 that EU Constitution is in line 
with the Spanish Constitution  
EE  Parliamentary ratification 
First half of 2005 
 
- Govt & major parties pro parliamentary ratification: simple majority needed 
(likely to be obtained) 
- Binding referenda for international treaties expressly excluded  
- Consultative referenda possible (ad-hoc law needed) 
EL  Parliamentary ratification 
Early 2005 
 
- Parliamentary ratification by 3/5 majority (likely) 
- No significant public debate about a referendum despite some late efforts by 
Socialists and the Coalition of Left and Progress.  
FI  Parliamentary Ratification, 
Early 2006 
- Stable centre-left government pro parliamentary ratification; PM Vahanen ruled 
out referendum 
- 2/3 majority needed for parliamentary ratification (likely to be obtained) 
- Constitution only foresees possibility of a consultative referendum 
(Conservatives and Greens in favour)  
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FR  Referendum  
June 2005 
- President has the power to call a referendum 
- Conseil Constitutionnel stated that ratification of EU-Constitution makes change 
of French Constitution necessary 
- Draft law on constitutional changes approved by Ministers on 3 Jan 2005 
and Assemblée Nationale on 1 Feb 2005  (Senate later  in February) 
- Both chambers convene as a Congress in March or April 2005; both must 
approve changes by 3/5 majority 
HU  Parliamentary ratification 
Ratified 20.12.2004 
-Parliamentary ratification needed 2/3 majority (unicameral parliament) 
- Referendum at request of 200,000 registered voters possible 
- 25% turnout necessary 
- Alliance of Free Democrats was only parliamentary party to argue in favour of a 
referendum 
IE  Referendum 
Late 2005 or early 2006 
- Obligatory, binding referendum for any transfer of power 
- Government to publish Constitutional Amendment Bill which must be approved 
by parliament and then put to the people for referendum 
- No minimum turnout required for referendum 
IT  Parliamentary ratification 
Early 2005 
-Parliamentary ratification by both houses with simple majority (likely) 
- Italian Constitution does not foresee referenda on international treaties 
- Only Lega Nord and Greens for constitutional reform to hold referendum 
- Parliamentary ratification process already started (lower house voted in favour 
on 25 January 2005, with 436 yes votes, 28 no votes & 5 abstentions) 
LV  Parliamentary ratification, 
Early 2005 
- Government aiming for quick parliamentary ratification  
- Simple majority needed (likely to be obtained) 
- If 50% of parliamentarians were in favour, a referendum could be called (not the 
case) 
LT  Parliamentary ratification,  
Ratified 11.11.2004 
-For parliamentary ratification, a simple majority was needed 
- No significant public debate about a possible referendum 
LU  Referendum 
10 July 2005 
- Consultative referendum will be held 
- Participation compulsory (as with elections) 
- Parliamentary ratification would need 2/3 majority 
MT  Parliamentary ratification 
Not before mid-2005 
- PM Gonzi excluded referendum on 5 June 2004 
- Parliamentary ratification needs simple majority (likely to be obtained) 
NL  Referendum 
Late May or June 2005 
- Non-obligatory, consultative referendum based on a parliamentary initiative 
- Special committee (members: e.g. from social advisory and elections council) 
will determine date, allocation of resources, formulation of question 
- Parliament will still have to ratify by 2/3 majority, but several parties have 
already indicated they will respect referendum outcome 
PL  Referendum 
Probably autumn 2005 
- Referendum likely together with presidential elections 
- 50% turnout needed in order to be valid 
- Parliamentary ratification would need 2/3 majority (unlikely) 
PT  Referendum 
Probably April 2005 
-  Non-obligatory referendum 
- Parliamentary ratification would require simple majority  
SK  Parliamentary ratification,  
Before summer 2005 
- Parliamentary majority of 3/5 needed (likely to be obtained) 
- President Gasparovic, PM Dzurinda and opposition leaders Fico and Meciar 
against referendum 
- Eurosceptic KDH (member of govt coalition) in favour of referendum 
SL  Parliamentary ratification, 
Ratified 
01.02.2005 
- 79 yes votes (4 no votes, 7 abstentions) 
- Government was against referendum, although Slovenian Constitution would   
have allowed it to call for one 
SE  Parliamentary ratification 
Probably December 2005 
- Parliamentary ratification needs simple majority (likely to be obtained) 
- PM Persson and 4 pro-Constitution opposition leaders against referendum 
- 1/3 of parliamentarians needed to call referendum: Not enough, as only 
eurosceptics (Green Party and Left Party) in favour 
- Ratification bill to be presented to Parliament by May 2005 
UK  Referendum 
Probably spring 2006 
- PM Blair called for referendum in April 2004, only after massive pressure from 
media and opposition 
- Referendum likely after UK EU Presidency (Jul-Dec 2005) in spring 2006 
- Referendum bill to be debated in Parliament early 2005 
- Wording of the bill: “Should the United Kingdom approve the Treaty 
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4.   Key Players in the Debate on Ratification of the European Constitution 
The findings from the survey confirm a number of expectations and general trends from previous 
experience with EU-related national debates and referenda. The national context and hence also 
national actors (individually and collectively) dominate the debates, even though the issue at hand is a 
European one. In this situation, national governments and political parties appear as the key actors on 
both sides of the debates. It is significant how little influence is being exerted at this early stage in the 
debates in most countries by any actor from outside the national political arena, although the Spanish 
case shows that in the immediate run-up to a referendum vote, there is likely to be more political 
activity including support from other national leaders (e.g. German Chancellor Schröder and French 
President Chirac's joint appearances with Spain's Prime Minister Zapatero).  
National governments and political parties 
According to our findings, the single most important actors are, not surprisingly, the national 
governments. This is partly due to their role in calling national referenda (which includes their 
prerogative to decide on the timing of such consultations, whether they are binding or non-binding – 
see Table 1), and partly to the fact that all member state governments have already assumed the 
responsibility for ratification by signing the Constitutional Treaty on 29 October 2004. In this context, 
the European institutions and in particular the European Commission have so far been reluctant to get 
too involved in the campaign. The Commissioner responsible for the Constitution, Margot Wallström, 
said in early 2005 that it would be “absolutely counter-productive for the Commission to try and 
impose anything on the member states”.
9 
Thus the national heads of government and often their foreign minister, especially when they are from 
another party in a coalition government (for example, Joschka Fischer, Gianfranco Fini, Cyril 
Svoboda) appear by default as key personalities in Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic, 
respectively, in promoting the ‘yes’ side. However, in some particular cases, this still depends on 
intervening national elections, as in the case of the United Kingdom where Tony Blair’s precise role 
seems as yet undecided; and possibly in Poland, where the referendum may be on the same day as the 
presidential elections in the autumn 2005. 
Similarly, as mentioned in section 3, this also means that the overwhelming majority of political 
parties in government or supporting a government, are in favour of the Constitution. But again some 
exceptions exist – usually in the form of junior coalition partners, or even movements within the larger 
parties such as for example “Debout la Republique”, which is made up of members of the UMP party 
in France, the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia, parts of the FPÖ in Austria and parts of 
the Lega Nord in Italy. Even among (main) opposition parties, there is widespread support at the 
parliamentary level in most countries. The only cases in this sample where the division between ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’ neatly coincides with the government-opposition fault line are the United Kingdom and 
(possibly) Malta (see section 3 on the Maltese Labour party), while the Czech Republic presents a 
more mixed picture with the main government party (CSSD) in favour and the main opposition party 
(ODS) ‘rather against’, but some of the smaller parties still undecided. In Poland, the picture is yet 
different, with the main opposition parties undecided (Citizens Platform, PSL) and some of the 
smaller, more extreme parties strongly against (Law and Justice, Self-Defence and League of Polish 
Families). 
This support of the political forces of the mainstream is particularly important because, apart from 
individual high-ranking office holders, parties are seen as the most prominent actors in the 
Constitutional debate in all countries. This is true also in those countries where there is not going to be 
a referendum and therefore the debate is, in many cases, almost exclusively conducted within the 
political system and between parties. In this context it is significant that the centre of the political 
spectrum from left-centre to right-centre is overwhelmingly in favour of the Constitution almost 
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everywhere, with the exception once more of the two most clearly bipartisan systems in the sample, 
the UK and Malta. 
Looking at the broad political party families (as constituted at EU level) to get a European picture of 
the party-political line-up, the centre-left parties (PES family) seem to be quite united after the internal 
vote of the French PS to support the Constitution, with the official position of 21 PES parties (out of 
22 mentioned in the survey) in favour, and only the Maltese Labour Party currently still undecided. 
Within the EPP Group (36 parties were mentioned), there is also a strong majority of parties in favour 
(27) but five parties (the Czech ODS, the Finnish Christian Democratic Party, the Estonian 
Fatherland’s Union, the Polish Citizens’ Platform and the Polish Peoples’ Party) are noted as ‘against’, 
and four others reported as ‘undecided’ (one smaller party each in Denmark, Estonia, Poland and 
Slovakia).   
Table 4. Overview of political parties opposed to the Constitution*  
MS Left  Right 
AT  Communist Party**  Freedom Party (18 /183; government coalition party, 
contradictory signals by different party actors) 
BE    Vlaams Belang (18 /150) 
Front national  
CZ  Communist Party (41 /200)  ODS (57 /200) 
DE  Party of Democratic Socialism  
(2 /603)  
National Democratic Party** 
The Republicans** 
DK  Unity List (4 /179) 
June Movement**  
Peoples’ Movement against the 
EU**  
Christian Democrats (4 /179)  
Danish Peoples’ Party (22 /179) 
EL  Communist Party (12 /300) 
Coalition of the Left for Progress 
(6 /300) 
 
ES  United Left (IU) (3 /350) 
Several regional parties (12 /350)  
 
FI    True Finns Party (3 /200) 
FR  Communist Party (21 /577) and 
other far left parties 
 
Movement for France (2 /577) 
National Front** 
Several political movements and splinter parties  
IE  Sinn Fein (5 /166) 
Socialist Party (1 /166) 
 
IT  Communist Re-foundation  
(11 /630)  
Lega Nord (28 / 630; government coalition party) 
MT  Labour Party (maybe) (31 /65)   
NL  Socialist Party (8 /150)  List Pim Fortuyn (8 /150) 
Christian Union (3 /150) 
Political Reformed Party (2 /150) 
PL  Partia Ludowo Democratyczna  
(10 /460) 
League of Polish Families (29 /460) 
Law and Justice (43/460) 
Catholic Movement (5/460) 
SE  The Greens (17 /349) 
Vänster-Party (30 /349) 
 
SK  Communist Party (9 /150)  Christian Democratic Movement (15 /150) 
UK  Green Party**  Conservative Party (162 /659) 
UK - Independence Party** 
British National Party** 
* Non-exhaustive list. Numbers refer to share of seats in national parliaments (1
st chambers). 
** No seats in national parliament (1
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The most pronounced opposition against the European Constitution comes from the fringes (both on 
the left and the right) of the political system. The green-left and far-left parties, socialist, communist or 
post-communist parties of the GUE-NGL family are against the Constitution in Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden, in particular in 
connection with the debate about the social content of the Constitution (see section 4). A separate 
category of the no-side in this context is constituted by some of the Spanish regionalist parties which 
oppose the Constitution because it fails to recognise their respective languages and  furthermore makes 
no mention of either their peoples or nations ( the Catalan ERC, the Nationalist Bloc of Galicia, the 
Aragonese Party and Eusko Alkartasuna, a minority Basque party).  
Fringe parties of the far right are also very often opposed to the European Constitution, which can 
probably be explained both by their rejection of particular elements of the Constitution or European 
integration in general, and by their role and interests as ‘anti-establishment’ or even ‘anti-system’ 
parties. This is most clearly the case for the five parties referred to in the survey from the 
Independence and Democracy family (ID) (including the UK Independence Party), which are all 
against the Constitution, while two parties from the Europe of Nations family (UEN: Fianna Fail from 
Ireland and Italy’s Alleanza Nazionale) are supporting the Treaty ratification, and just the Polish Law 
and Justice Party is clearly against, while the Estonian People’s Union seems to be ambivalent. 
Forceful opposition on the right comes also from parties that are non-aligned at the European level and 
that might have a considerable impact on the debates in their national contexts (the Vlaams Blok, now 
Vlaams Belang) in Belgium, the so far ‘undecided’ (and internally split) FPÖ in Austria, the List Pim 
Fortuyn in the Netherlands, or in Poland the League of Polish Families and the ‘Ruch Katolicko-
Narodowy’ Catholic movement). All in all, 24 parties, individual lists or movements outside the large 
European party families are reported against the Constitution across the 20 member states in the 
present survey. 
The ‘no’ side also includes another category of actors that will certainly make their voices heard but 
which in some cases elude traditional classification as a political party in a strict sense, i.e. the 
pressure groups or popular movements specifically set-up for the EU (even though, like in the case of 
the Danish June Movement, of long standing), the ‘Danish Peoples Movement against the EU’ or the 
particular campaign organisations (for and against the Constitution) that are emerging in the British 
debate. Here the borderline between civic organisation, party politics and mere campaign-tool is very 
fluid. 
Individual actors 
As far as individual personalities and their impact on the Constitution’s ratification are concerned, the 
assessment of their visibility and influence can only be a snapshot of the state of debate at a given 
point in time. As mentioned, leading figures of the national governments are bound to be central in all 
the debates. Many of them are ‘constrained’ by previous action to support the Constitution. Exceptions 
occur where there are divisions between different levels of the executive or within coalitions (as in the 
Czech Republic, where President Václav Klaus is likely to be against the Constitution but is expected 
to keep a low profile, or in Italy where the leader of one partner in Berlusconi’s government, the 
Northern League, is against the Constitution or at least against the process of ratification without 
referendum).  
The second-most-important category of individuals consists of party leaders who will take a side in the 
debate, in particular if they also hold other functions (Edmund Stoiber (Germany), Elio Di Rupo 
(Belgium), Umberto Bossi (Italy) and Gerry Adams (Ireland)). Party leaders are likely to be very 
prominent because of the parties’ key role in the campaigns. This means that national political players 
finally have to take sides in the European debate, especially those not in a position of responsibility for 
the national government, who often use European questions as a powerful weapon against their 
national political opponents. Yet, also at this level, the absence of a clear influence of the European 
dimension on the dynamics of this contest means that the Constitution issue could become a mere 
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Despite this predominance of national politicians, there seems to be some role for members of the 
European Parliament and/or former members of the Convention which drafted the Constitution: 
individuals such as Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium), Johannes Voggenhuber (Austria), Frans 
Timmermans (the Netherlands), Jan Zahradil (Czech Republic) or Jens-Peter Bonde (Denmark) are 
mentioned by the national experts but, significantly, only within their own national context. 
This is indeed one of the most striking, but not surprising results of the present survey. So far, no 
impact is visible or seems to be expected of prominent personalities from other countries, even though 
this might change as the actual dates of the votes approach. This ties in with the general absence of the 
European institutions from the national scene so far. Even where (current or former) members of the 
European Commission are identified as important actors, they are only the ‘national ones’ (Estonia: 
Silm Kallas, United Kingdom: Neil Kinnock and Chris Patten) and in many cases they are former 
foreign ministers (Austria: Ferrero Waldner, Belgium: Louis Michel, Italy: Franco Frattini). There is 
also, as far as this survey reveals, no visible engagement to date of prominent non-political actors 
(celebrities as ‘ambassadors’ of the Constitution), but this is also bound to change in referendum 
countries in the immediate run-up to the vote (in fact, in Spain the ‘hot phase’ of campaigning does 
involve a number of celebrities, including some from other member states). The lack of cross-border 
campaigning at this stage, however, suggests that there is limited scope for the European-level 
political class to actively engage in the national ratification debates (see section 5 on Issues). 
 
Societal actors 
The question then is whether the ‘other players’ who might participate on one or the other side of the 
debate – i.e. the ‘key social elites such as trade unions, business groupings and religious organisations’ 
–will be more inclined and/or in a better position to promote a European level of awareness and debate 
(see Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2004, p. 568). The survey questions specifically asked both about the role 
of other (i.e. non-national government) ‘institutional’ actors and about ‘civil society’ actors to take 
account of different structural features of the member states (such as regional devolution), as well as 
soliciting answers on the social partners, business and churches. Table 5 gives an overview of the 
responses from the national experts. 
In the institutional section, the Constitutional Courts (or Councils) have so far played a formal role 
(supporting the Constitution) only in Luxembourg and Spain, and the Constitutional Court in Slovakia 
has informally taken a pro-ratification stance, but in some cases these Courts might have to rule later 
on the outcome of the referenda or specific provisions of the Constitution (e.g. in Spain).  
Regions as independent actors will play some part in the ratification process in those member states 
with more or less developed federal structures (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain), but the 
degree of real influence over the national ratification process differs widely (with the German Länder 
being influential via the second chamber of Parliament, and the Belgian regional and cultural 
authorities having to ratify separately, while the Italian regions having no substantial influence). In any 
case, in most of these countries there seems to be widespread support for the Constitution at the sub-
national institutional level. A slight qualification, however, is necessary with regard to Spain, where, 
as mentioned above, the attitude of some regional parties to the language regime of the EU means that 
not all regional players are in favour of ratifying the Constitution. 
Non-institutional players 
As for other social players mentioned, we first concentrate on the classical ‘social partners’. Both 
trade unions and employers are seen as being ‘in favour’ of the Constitution in most countries where 
they appear as relevant actors. In particular in Belgium and even more in France, however, the unions 
are divided and some object to the lack of social provisions in the Constitution. In some countries the 
position of the unions is not clear yet (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France and Ireland). The employers 
on the other hand are noted as being ‘in favour’ in 11 countries, and there is no country with an 
official employers’ position against the Constitution. As for the business community, nine countries 
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report a generally positive attitude (which ties in with the use of the ‘economic benefit argument’, see 
section 5) and nowhere so far are there signs of strong business opposition, even though business 
leaders in the UK are divided as to the possible benefits and risks stemming from the Constitution and 
seem to grow more sceptical over time.
10 Some are also hesitant to become engaged because of 
potential negative consequences from anti-European tabloids. This hesitation could turn out to have an 
important impact on campaign resources, because the ‘no’ camp on the other hand will partially be 
funded by individual contributors. 
As far as ‘the church’ is concerned, the survey did not specify any particular religious groups and the 
responses received seem to refer to the main (institutionalised) churches. In this perspective, the 
church is seen to be supporting the Constitution in Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Italy, while in 
Ireland, Poland and Slovakia, because of the discussion about a reference to God in the Constitution’s 
preamble, the position of the Church is not clear. In particular in Poland it is likely that the official 
Church position will be neutral, while at a local level there will be critical voices in many cases. 
Table 5. Civil society social partners 
MS Unions  Employers Business  Church  Other 
AT  Not clear  Not clear  For     
BE Some  against         
CY Many  against  For  For     
CZ  Not clear  Not clear  Rather for  For   
DK  For  For  For    Two single-issue movements: 
against 
EE     For     
FR Divided  For       
DE For  For  For  For   
EL  Mostly for  Mostly for    Mostly for   
IE Divided  For  For  Probably  for   
IT  For  For    For  Some Catholic movements: 
against 
LU For  For  For  For   
MT For  For  For  For   
PL       Divided: 
national level 
neutral, local 
level against 
 
SK  For  For    Probably against  National Convention for the 
EU: in favour 
ES  For  For  For    Anti-global movements: against 
UK    Generally for  Divided    Campaign movements in favour 
and against 
 
Finally a wealth of other actors will be participating on both sides in the debates about the European 
Constitution. Such diverse players as think tanks, semi-permanent structures like the Slovak 
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Convention on the EU, lobbying organisations, the media and anti-globalisation networks will all 
contribute to the debates, particularly in the referendum countries. More structured information over a 
longer period of time would be needed to allow an evaluation of the state and intensity of their 
contributions to the national debates. Yet, what again emerges clearly from the survey is the weakness 
so far of cross-national/European exchange or activity of actors, even though some groups (like the 
pro-Constitution European Movement) are trying to establish such patterns of interaction. With the 
ratification process gathering pace throughout 2005, it is likely that all parties concerned, as well as 
the media in different countries will increasingly tap into European-level discussions to promote their 
respective aims, but for the time being the European Constitution is subject to solidly national debates. 
5.   Prominent Issues in the Debate about Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in 
the Member States 
For the purpose of our survey, a number of standard issues were identified which have been divided 
into two main categories: issues of a more general, political nature and issues that are, at least in 
principle, of a more technical nature, directly related to the content of the Constitutional Treaty. A 
third important group of arguments having an impact on the debates is linked to the national level: The 
performance of the respective national government is likely to play a role in all member states holding 
a referendum, especially where dissatisfaction is high and voters then seize the opportunity to ‘present 
the bill’ to the government. In the Czech Republic (parliamentary elections) and Poland (presidential 
elections), it is even likely that national elections will be held the same day. As the national dimension 
will play a role in all countries to some degree, the focus of the following section will be on the two 
dimensions linked to the European level to better highlight the differences between and similarities 
among member states. 
As it turned out, most of the issues that were put forward seem to be recurring in the debates in 
numerous countries, with different degrees of salience and used either in favour of or against the 
proposed ratification of the Treaty. 
Before analysing in detail the specific arguments, it is worth stressing a general point, which may have 
an impact on the ratification process. Indeed, according to the findings of our survey, there are more 
countries in which ratification is supported on the basis of technical reasons than there are countries in 
which general political considerations are put forward in favour of ratification.  
To a certain extent, this can be seen as legitimating ex post the work carried out by the Convention 
first and by the Intergovernmental Conference afterwards. Indeed, most of the qualifying points of the 
Constitution are likely to be used as arguments in favour of its ratification in most of the member 
states. The clearest examples are the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the new 
provisions on CFSP. According to our experts, the Charter is going to be used as an argument in 
favour of ratification in 12 of the 20 surveyed countries, and as an argument against it in only three 
(Ireland, Slovakia and United Kingdom: in the first two states, incorporation will actually be used in 
the campaign as an argument both in favour and against ratification – in the latter case because the 
steps taken to make it legally binding are not considered sufficiently far-reaching). The new provisions 
on CFSP are regarded as a step in the right direction introduced by the Treaty, and therefore used as an 
argument in favour of its ratification in 10 countries, as opposed to two countries where it is believed 
that this point will be used by the ‘no’ camp (Austria and Sweden, in both cases for reasons related to 
the neutrality of the country). Moreover, the innovative clause allowing a country to withdraw from 
the Union, with its potentially far-reaching consequences, is present in the debate in only six of the 
surveyed member states, but in all of them the clause appears to be used mainly by the pro-ratification 
camp, as an argument in favour of ratification. In particular, the clause seems to be considered as an 
important safeguard in Denmark and in the increasingly eurosceptic Austria.  
However, this focus on the issues directly related to the Constitutional Treaty also gives rise to some 
concerns. The problem is that issues of this kind, such as for example the double majority system or 
the extension of qualified majority voting, are inherently less interesting for the general public. It is 
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unlikely to catch the citizens’ imagination. This in turn means that it will be more difficult to elicit the 
kind of attention necessary to ensure the attainment of the required thresholds in those countries that 
will carry out a referendum.  
Finally, one indication that seems to emerge quite clearly from the analysis of both the political issues 
and of the ones directly related to the Treaty is that the citizens of the EU want the Union to be more 
active in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Indeed, in half of the states monitored, the 
fact that the Constitutional Treaty seemingly creates the preconditions for an enhanced role of the EU 
on the global stage will be used as a point in favour of ratification during the campaign, with the UK 
being the only country where the argument will be used as an element against ratification.  
The general (political) arguments 
Among the political arguments that will figure prominently in the campaign, there are several that 
recur more frequently: first there is the argument about membership, i.e. the fact that if a given country 
does not ratify it may have to withdraw from the Union and that thus, conversely, ratification is a 
condition for continued membership (such argument is used either in favour or against ratification in a 
total of 17 out of 20 surveyed member states). Second, there is an argument about the geographical 
limits of Europe, which in the questionnaire was linked to the Union’s identity, and the perceived 
threat to it that may come as a result of too many enlargements. The third argument concerns the more 
pragmatic considerations about the economic benefits deriving from membership of the Union. The 
two latter sets of topics will be used by campaigners in 15 member states. Two other issues that 
feature in the debates of many countries are the already-mentioned ‘Role of Europe in the World’ 
(linked to the provisions on CFSP), which is debated in 11 countries, and the European social model, 
which has polarised the debate in opposite directions in 12 countries. 
Beginning with membership of the European Union, this argument is still considered in many 
member states (11 of them) as a powerful case in favour of ratification. At the same time, the fact that 
there are also various states (6) where opponents to the Treaty believe it is productive (convenient) to 
use the argument against ratification is a sign that citizens of those countries are increasingly 
dissatisfied with the way the Union is working and/or the direction it is taking. In particular, while it 
may be reassuring to see that membership can act as a positive factor in old member states, such as the 
Netherlands and Spain, as well as, albeit in a different sense and with a different weight, in Denmark, 
it is not a particularly positive omen that campaigners in the recently acceding state of Poland have 
already questioned the value of the country’s membership of the Union (using it as an argument 
against ratification). Perhaps even more worrying is the fact that membership of the Union, or at least 
of this kind of Union (portrayed as prey to a liberal drift and with no clear roadmap for the future), is 
brought up as a reason to oppose ratification of the Treaty by some of the political forces in France, 
one of the founding members and supposedly a cornerstone of European integration. 
 The picture is even bleaker if one looks at the question of the geographical limits of Europe, which 
encompasses both the enlargements that the Union should still undergo and the partially unrelated 
vexed question of the accession of Turkey to the club. There are two lines of thought that come 
together in this debate: on the one hand the arguments that focus on the doubts engendered by the 
accession of a poor, large (in size and population) and predominantly Muslim country, and on the 
other the concern that too many enlargements will water down the European identity, making it 
impossible to identify any distinguishing features of the Union. The result is that the question of the 
limits and the identity of the Union will probably be used as an evocative argument against ratification 
in as many as 12 member states, while according to our experts it will be used as a positive factor in 
only 3 of them (Ireland, and, more interestingly, Greece and Cyprus). Note however that in all three 
countries the argument is being used both in favour of and against ratification).  
Not surprisingly, the argument of the economic benefits deriving from EU membership will mostly 
be used by campaigners to convince voters that it is in their interest to ratify the Treaty (this is 
predicted to happen in 11 member states, as opposed to only 4 of them in which the economic benefits 
– or lack there of – will be put forward as an argument against). It is also logical that the weight of this 16 | RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
argument should be particularly relevant in the new member states, countries that, after years of 
sacrifices to join the club, are now looking forward to reaping the benefits of membership. These 
states are in principle going to be the main net beneficiaries of EU funding in the coming years, and 
therefore in not a single one of them are the political actors likely to call into question the economic 
benefits, nor are they likely to use them as an argument against ratification of the Treaty. It is worth 
observing that this is in fact expected to be the only argument that will play a clear role in favour of 
ratification in Poland, and one can only hope that the prospect of EU funds will act as adequate 
incentive to bring the Polish voters to the ballot box. Yet it is not just the campaigners in the new 
member states that will seize upon the economic argument to convince their citizens to go and vote for 
the Constitutional Treaty. This argument will play a role in various of the old member states as well, 
especially those that have benefited significantly from EU coffers, e.g. Greece, Spain and the success-
story Ireland. More telling is the fact that the economic benefits are going to be used as a positive 
factor even in Germany (even though in the latter case economic benefits should probably be 
interpreted in a broader sense, e.g. the positive effects for German exports that will derive from being 
part of the single market).  
The role that Europe should play in the world is, as mentioned above, one of the aces up the sleeve 
of the ‘yes’ campaigners. In virtually every member state in which this concept enters into the debate, 
it will feature as an argument in favour of ratification (based on the assumption that the Constitutional 
Treaty lays the foundation for an more substantial role of the Union on the world stage). It may for 
example become the only argument to be regarded positively in the Austrian public debate (where, 
however, the Treaty will be ratified by parliamentary vote, and the political forces are largely in favour 
of ratification, notwithstanding the growing popular dissatisfaction with the European project).  
The last often-recurring factor is the European social model and the extent to which it has been 
enshrined in the Treaty. As mentioned above, this factor is a matter for debate in as many as 12 
countries. However, unlike the other issues analysed so far, the social dimension of the Treaty will 
predominantly be used as an argument against ratification. Indeed, this will be the case in eight 
member states, double the number of those in which it will be presented as a valid reason to ratify. The 
irony is that countries where the European social model is used as an argument against ratification of 
the Treaty – because the latter has not adequately safeguarded or enhanced the former – find 
themselves on the same side of the barricade as a country that traditionally holds more conservative 
(sceptical) views on the European social model, i.e. the United Kingdom, where as a matter of fact this 
will be one of the main arguments used against ratification of the Treaty (especially because of the 
concerns of some representatives of the business community).  
A similar paradox can be observed with regard to the Stability and Growth Pact. According to our 
findings, this rather sensitive issue will feature in the debate in only five countries out of 20, and in all 
of them it is likely to be used as an argument against ratification of the Treaty. But opponents of the 
Treaty will use this argument both in those small-and medium-sized countries (Austria and the 
Netherlands) that have been rigorous in their compliance with the Pact – in which case the negative 
bias will be based on the fact that the Pact has been merrily disregarded by the big member states – 
and in those same large member states (France, Germany and Italy), where on the contrary the 
argument against ratification rests on the fact that what is perceived as an excessively rigid Pact has 
been enshrined in the Constitution. It will be interesting to see whether there will be a change in 
attitude if and when the member states reach an agreement on the reform of the SGP in the course of 
2005, as is foreseen.  
Finally, it seems that efficiency and democracy of the Union, two of the main goals set by the Laeken 
Council for the Convention and the ensuing IGC, will also play an important role in the debates in 
various member states. But while most people seem to agree that the Treaty has indeed made the 
Union more efficient, and the latter will thus be used as an argument in favour of ratification in seven 
member states out of nine (Sweden and the UK being the two only countries where campaigners 
believe that the Treaty has not done enough in terms of boosting the Union’s efficiency, and will 
therefore use this as an argument against its ratification), the picture is more mixed when it comes to WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? | 17 
democracy. The scoreboard of the democratic advances introduced by the Treaty will be used as a 
positive argument in six countries (France, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia), but in four others those opposing the Treaty will be claiming that the latter has not really 
improved the democratic outlook of the Union and should therefore not be ratified (again Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, plus Estonia and Denmark). 
Table 6. Most recurring political arguments in the surveyed member states 
Argument In  Favour  Against 
EU membership  CZ, DK, EST, FI, EL, IR, NL, SK, 
ES 
AT, FR, PL, SE 
Limits and identity  CY, EL, IR  AT, BE, DK, EST, FR, EL, IR, IT, 
NL, SK 
Economic benefits  CY, CZ, SF, DE, EL, IR, PL, SK, 
ES, SE, UK 
AT, CY, FR, UK 
Europe’s role in the world  AT, CY, DK, FR, DE, EL, IR, IT, 
ES, UK 
UK 
European social model  CY, CZ, IR, ES  BE, CY, DK, EST, FI, FR, IR, UK 
Stability and Growth Pact    AT, FR, DE, IT, NL 
Efficiency  BE, DK, FR, DE, IT, SK, SE  SE, UK 
Democracy  CZ, DK, FR, DE, IR, SK  DK, EST, SE, UK 
 
Issues directly related to the content of the Constitutional Treaty 
Moving on to the issues directly linked to the Constitutional Treaty, we found that the argument that is 
used most frequently concerns the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is an 
element of the debate in 15 out of 20 member states, and it is presented predominantly as an argument 
in favour of ratification – in 12 out of the 15. In two out of the three remaining states (Belgium and 
Slovakia), the argument will be used by campaigners both in favour and against ratification. In 
particular, according to our national expert, the argument will be used against ratification in Belgium 
where some actors regard the progress entailed by incorporation as ‘too limited’. It is only in the 
United Kingdom that the Charter will be used against ratification due to the fear, on the part of 
business organisations in particular, that its incorporation in the Treaty “will threaten social 
legislation, widen the scope of EU competences, strengthen trade unions and create new social rights”.  
Sharing second place in the chart of the most recurrent issues are the provisions on Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and the extension of the areas in which decisions will be taken by qualified 
majority voting (QMV) in the Council. But while in the first case the argument will by and large be 
used in favour of ratification (in 10 out of 12 countries), the question of the scope of QMV continues 
to be a sensitive issue within the Union. For this reason, it will be used more often by those who are 
campaigning against ratification than by those that are in favour of it, although by a narrow margin (it 
will be used as an argument against in seven countries, and in favour in five of them). The dividing 
line is not surprising, since it reflects the positions on the topic that were publicly held by member 
states’ negotiators during the intergovernmental conference. Thus, while the extension of the areas to 
which QMV applies will be used as an argument in favour of ratification in states that are usually quite 
at ease with deeper integration (such as France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), in those 
countries that are traditionally more jealous of their sovereignty (such as Sweden, UK, Denmark, 
Austria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), the opponents to the Treaty tend to include the extension 
of QMV in their arsenal of arguments against ratification.  
One can notice a similar situation with regard to the other main element of disagreement within the 
IGC, namely the system of majority voting itself. It is not a coincidence that the 10 countries where 
the topic features as an element of the debate are split down the middle between those where the 
switch to the new voting system will be advanced as an argument in favour of ratification and those 
where the argument will be brought up by anti-ratification campaigners. In this respect, it is hardly 18 | RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
surprising to see that the double-majority system will be portrayed in a negative light by some political 
forces in Spain and Poland, countries whose governments fought until the last minute of the IGC to 
retain the advantageous deal they had cut at Nice. On the other hand, it is a bit discomfiting to see 
France (which, were the Constitutional Treaty to come into force, would lose its so far jealously-
guarded parity with Germany) and the Czech Republic feature among the countries where the 
argument is likely to be used by those opposed to ratification. The debate in the Czech Republic in 
particular can be of interest, as it seems to represent one of the few cases where there is an explicit 
transnational influence. Indeed, the ‘no’ campaigners in that country contend that the Czech Republic 
should have joined forces with neighbouring Poland to defend the more convenient voting 
arrangement agreed at Nice. 
Another equally divisive issue remains that of the Permanent President of the European Council, 
which will be appropriated by the opponents to ratification in five member states, while it will be put 
forward as a good reason to ratify in five others. Campaigners in those countries that were in favour of 
retaining the rotating Presidency will argue that their government’s wishes on this point have not been 
granted, and therefore the Treaty should not be ratified. In this context, it is again interesting to 
comment on the position in which the UK finds itself. If one were to look only at the strategic interests 
of the country, the fact that a Permanent President of the EU Council is foreseen by the Constitutional 
Treaty should be regarded as a positive development – after all, this was one of Tony Blair’s main 
desiderata, with a view to increasing the Union’s efficiency. But in the heated climate of the pre-
referendum debate, the argument may also be turned on its head by opponents to the Treaty, who will 
present this development as evidence that many continental partners do indeed have a hidden federalist 
agenda.  
Less controversial is the other new post introduced by the Constitutional Treaty: that of EU Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. Reflecting also in this case the large consensus that had arisen within the 
Convention, the argument is likely to be used in favour of the ratification of the Treaty in an 
overwhelming majority of the member states in whose debates it will feature. This seems to be in line 
with the above-mentioned findings on the CFSP, which is not only present as an argument in the 
debate of a large majority of the member states, but it is also used as an argument in favour of 
ratification.  
 
Table 7. Issues directly linked to the Constitutional Treaty that frequently occur in the member states’ 
debates 
Argument In  Favour Against 
Charter of Fundamental Rights  AT, BE, CZ, FR, DE, EL, IR, IT, 
NL, EE, SE 
UK 
Voting Weights (double majority)  AT, DE, IR, SK, UK  CZ, FR, PL, ES 
Extension of QMV  FR, DE, IT, NL  A, CZ, DK, SK, SE, UK 
Exit Clause  AT, CZ, DK, EST, IR, UK   
Provisions for enhanced 
cooperation 
DK, FR, DE, UK  CZ, EST, IR, PL 
Permanent EU President  CY, FR, DE, IT  IR, NL, SK, SE, UK 
EU Foreign Minister  AT, CY, FR, DE, IRL, NL, SK, ES  IR, UK 
CFSP  AT, BE, CY, EST, FR, DE, EL, IR, 
IT, ES 
AT, SE 
 
Overall, as was anticipated at the beginning of this section, the arguments directly related to the 
content of the Constitutional Treaty are more likely to be deployed in favour of its ratification. Also in 
those countries where the picture looks rather bleak if one considers only the more general political 
arguments, the ones directly linked to the Treaty come to the rescue and appear to give some punch to 
the ‘yes’ campaigns. This is particularly evident in the cases of Austria, where all of the political WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? | 19 
arguments will probably be present in the debate as factors against the Treaty, whereas among the 
more technical ones there is a slight predominance of the arguments in favour of ratification. Similarly 
in France, where of the eight main political issues around which the debate will revolve five will be 
used against ratification, whereas out of the same number of technical arguments (8), seven will be 
used in favour of the Treaty. Furthermore, with regard to the issues directly related to the content of 
the treaty, it is worth underlining that the political actors in Germany and Italy in particular seem to be 
quite satisfied with the way their governments have pursued their agenda in the intergovernmental 
negotiations. All of the main constitutional issues that will play a role in the debate in the two 
countries will indeed be used as arguments in favour of ratification (respectively 7 and 6).  
Furthermore, the analysis of the available data seems to show that the political forces that will be 
campaigning in favour of ratification in those countries whose public opinion is usually considered 
eurosceptic will have a hard time not only because they have to sway a large number of voters, but 
also because the number of arguments that are likely to be used against ratification is higher. 
According to the findings of our survey, the three countries that seem to be in this situation are 
Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the first two, however, it is highly unlikely that a 
referendum will be held. Another result that our survey seems to give is that the situation in Denmark 
may be more positive than observers usually think.  
Finally, our survey shows that cross-national influences in the debates have so far been very limited 
and often affect only immediately neighbouring countries. Also, only the debates in large countries 
have so far been found to exert influence in other member states. France was mentioned as influential 
for Belgium (debate on ‘social Europe’ within the French PS ‘spilled over’ to the francophone PS in 
Belgium), Germany (where the questions was asked why French (and British) citizens could have a 
say on the Constitution while Germans were denied this right by their political elite) and the UK 
(where the French debate on ‘social Europe’ is also seen as holding some potential to fuel the British 
one, even though with likely calls for less ‘red-tape’ rather than more social protection). The UK 
media might become influential for the Irish debate and in Austria the German debate about holding a 
referendum was closely observed. The Czech eurosceptics reproach their government for not taking an 
equally firm stand as the Polish on the voting weights in the Council during the IGC.  
The currently very limited cross-national references are however likely to increase in countries that are 
to hold referenda rather late, when the many other countries that will have already ratified are likely to 
be cited as an argument against ‘isolation’ in the EU-25. 
6.   Conclusion: Finally a European Debate? 
It was clear from the very beginning that the debate(s) on the ratification of the ‘Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’ would take place first and foremost in the national arenas. At the same time, 
however, the ratification of this Treaty is unique in that never before have so many popular 
consultations been conducted on the same (European) issue. It was hoped that the effect would be the 
promotion of a European debate across national, linguistic and cultural boundaries of the member 
states. 
In any case, our report underlines that the Constitution is very likely to be ratified in nearly all member 
states, despite the fact that the procedures vary widely from country to country (see section 3). With 
this diversity and the many different national political considerations influencing the timing and 
organisation of the ratification procedures, it was always going to be a difficult task to bring out the 
European dimension in the debates. This structure also means that national actors, first and foremost 
the national governments and the national political parties, will be the key actors to watch in the 
exchanges about the Constitution. Involvement from trans-European actors will be most crucial in the 
referendum countries but even there so far only Spain shows that non-national actors (i.e. Schröder 
and Chirac) get involved close to the actual voting.  
This strong national focus presents a risk for the ratification in some countries because in the national 
setting one particular issue (e.g. more efficiency and democratic control for the EU, or the role of 20 | RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
Europe in the world) can be used by proponents of both sides, in a way that is incompatible with the 
debates in other countries. The analysis of different issues in different Member States has shown 
(section 5) that if the reasons for a particular European compromise are not made transparent to the 
citizens, such issues can be used in a divisive way at the national level.  
At the same time, opportunities exist to develop a more ‘European’ debate. The fact that there is 
widespread support for the Constitution from the political mainstream in all countries and the fact that 
a number of key issues are present in all the debates testify to the potential European dimension of the 
Constitution issue. For this dimension to become more prominent, however, a concerted effort from 
actors (institutional, collective and individual) ‘across the EU’ would be needed. So far, the European 
dimension seems not to be visible at the national end. Political parties, social movements and other 
civil society players seem to be ‘trapped’ by the national (legal and political) frameworks. The 
European institutions have a key role to play in this situation and finally seem ready to take on the 
challenge. In particular, the European Parliament adopted on 12 January 2005 its pro-Constitution 
position and is now committed to promoting its ratification. 
These efforts, however, will be in vain unless the media in all member states playing their part in the 
debate. So far, except for particular cases (like the influence of the British anti-Constitution media on 
the Irish debate), little reference is made in the survey to the media taking a pro-active role in the 
debate. With the first referendum in Spain in February, and more countries ratifying soon, it can be 
expected that the interest in a comparative reporting will increase. This report hopes to provide a 
starting point for such a comprehensive approach to what is, in any case, a foundational moment for 
the whole of the European Union. 
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Annex 2 
The Survey 
EPIN  EUROPEAN  
POLICY  
INSTITUTE 
NETWORK 
RATIFICATION MONITOR  
NATIONAL EXPERTS SURVEY 
 
COUNTRY:  
RESPONDENT   (name) 
   (organisation): 
 
1. Ratification Procedure and Date 
 
a) Which ratification procedure will apply in your country? 
￿ Referendum, legally binding 
￿ Referendum, consultative 
￿ Parliamentary Ratification only 
 
b) What will the procedure look like?  Are there any procedural peculiarities (e.g. minimum turnout 
in referenda)? Please specify. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………............
....................................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................... 
 
c) If a referendum is held:  
(1) What will be the date?...................................................................................................... 
(2) Who will convoke it (e.g. government/ parliament/ president)? ………………………. 
(3 If already known, what will be the wording of the referendum question(s)? 
................................................................................................................................................. 
(4) If the referendum is consultative, what is the motivation for holding the referendum? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………..............
..............................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
2. Support for the Constitutional Treaty 
 
a) How strong do recent polls suggest is the likely support for the Constitutional Treaty going to be in 
your country? (please name date & source of poll :………………………………….) 
- In a Referendum (in %): 
•  Yes….. 
•  No….. 
•  Undecided….. 
- In Parliament (in %) 
•  Yes…………....Which parties?...... 
•  No………..........Which parties?....... 
•  Undecided……..Which parties?....... 
b) In the light of current public opinion, how high do you rate the overall probability that the 
Constitutional Treaty will be ratified in your country?  
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3. Key Players 
 
Which important players are likely to take on an important role in the debate about ratification? 
Please specify whether in favour or against the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
a) Institutions 
  ￿ Constitutional Court……………………………. ￿for…..￿against 
  ￿ Regions/ Second Chamber………………………￿for ….￿against 
  ￿ Other (please specify)……………………………￿for ….￿against 
 
b) Civil Society 
  ￿ Unions…………………………………………...￿for….￿against 
  ￿ Employers Associations……………………….. ￿for….￿against 
  ￿ Business…………………………………………￿for….￿against 
  ￿ Church………………………………………......￿for….￿against 
  ￿ Other (please specify)…………………………..￿for….￿against 
 
 
4. Personalities 
 
Please identify the most notable personalities that are likely to influence the debate in your country. 
 
Name  Party or Affiliation  Position on the Constitutional Treaty 
   
   
   
 
 
5. Positions of national political parties? 
(Please fill in the table. Complete or correct other details wherever needed. Please add important 
parties not mentioned below.) 
 
Party name  English 
translation 
Government 
Party  
(Yes/ No) 
Share of 
Seats in 
Nat. Parl. 
(Approx.) 
EP Party 
Group 
Position on the 
Constitutional 
Treaty 
(For/ Against/ 
Undecided) 
       
       
 
 
6. Central themes and issues in ratification campaign 
 
What topics, do you expect, will dominate the campaign for ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in 
your country? And how do you think will the subject influence the public opinion on the Constitution? 
 
a) Overarching themes linked to the EU:  
  ￿ EU-membership in general (e.g. national sovereignty & independence) 
    ￿ in favour  ￿ against   WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? | 25 
 
  ￿ Limits and identity of the EU (e.g. membership of Turkey) 
  ￿  in  favour  ￿  against     
  ￿ Economic benefits (e.g. regional & agricultural funds, access to common market) 
￿ in favour  ￿ against 
  ￿ Budgetary Issues (e.g. “netpayer” debate) 
    ￿ in favour  ￿ against   
  ￿ Efficiency of the EU (e.g. capacity to act of the EU-25) 
￿ in favour  ￿ against 
  ￿ Democracy of the EU (e.g. democratic control of the “Brussels bureaucracy”)  
￿ in favour  ￿ against 
  ￿ EU’s Role in the World (e.g. “global player”, transatlantic relations) 
￿ in favour  ￿ against 
  ￿ ‘European Social Model’ 
￿ in favour  ￿ against 
  ￿ Future of the Stability Pact 
￿ in favour  ￿ against 
  ￿ Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………... 
￿ in favour  ￿ against 
 
b) Issues directly linked to the Constitutional Treaty: 
￿ Voting weights in the Council: ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
￿ Extension of QMV: ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ Charter of Fundamental Rights: ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ Exit Clause: ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ Provisions for ‘enhanced cooperation (‘Core Europe’): ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ Permanent EU President: ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ EU Foreign Minister: ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ Common Foreign Policy (CFSP): ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ Common Security Policy (ESDP):  
  ￿ JHA issues (Asylum Policy, Border Control, etc.): ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ European Public Prosecutor: ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  ￿ Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………… 
    ￿ in favour…..￿ against 
 
c) National issues (e.g. government performance). Please specify. 
……………………………………………………………………￿ in favour…..￿ against 
……………………………………………………………………￿ in favour…..￿ against 
  
 
 
7. Influences from other Member States on the domestic debate.  
 
Has the domestic debate on the constitution been influenced by events in other Member States? Please 
specify. 
Member State(s): …………………………………………………………………………………… 
Subject (s) / Event(s):  
(1)................................................................................................................................................................ 
￿ in favour…..￿ against 
(2)................................................................................................................................................................ 
￿ in favour…..￿ against 
(3)................................................................................................................................................................ 
￿ in favour…..￿ against  
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About EPIN 
 
 
  EPIN is a network of European policy think tanks and institutes. It has 30 member think 
tanks across 25 countries, including most EU member states and candidate countries. 
Over the coming two years, within the framework of the Ratification Monitor project, EPIN 
intends to monitor the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty and the debates 
that will surround it in all of the member states. It will provide comprehensive, coherent 
and easy access for all those interested in the European policy debate. Beyond the 
Constitutional Treaty, EPIN’s network of think tanks will provide analysis of all the 
different national debates, and of the complex political dynamics of the pan-European 
debate.  
 
 
Aims and Objectives 
 
•  To promote and develop pan-European debate and understanding on the key 
issues associated with the future of Europe.  
 
•  To promote discussion and understanding of the political dynamics of the different 
national debates, and trans-European comparisons of discourse on EU-related 
issues. 
 
•  To hold meetings in the member states and candidate countries and further 
meetings in Brussels offering different national views of the debate, involving a range 
of different civil society actors as well as policy-makers, analysts and commentators. 
 
•  To develop interaction, contacts and exchange of information and analysis 
across the members of the network. 
 
•  To undertake and encourage joint analysis and to publish joint working papers 
on the key issues of the debate. 
 
•  To promote international communication and dissemination of the network’s 
activities and outputs.  
 
EPIN is coordinated by a Steering Committee made up of representatives of the Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS, Brussels), the Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherche 
Notre Europe (France), the Real Instituto Elcano (Spain), the Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies (SIEPS, Sweden) and the Centre for European Reform (CER, UK).
 
 